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Our federal, state, and local governments are not investing in the design and 
improvement of strategies for evaluating the costs associated with natural and man-made 
disasters and events. In this era of fiscal conservatism, one of the biggest challenges in 
designing and funding public health preparedness is deciding exactly how much to invest 
and determining the impact of those investments. 
This thesis developed a rigorous scientific model to evaluate the benefit of using 
value-based tools to enhance the effectiveness of public health preparedness programs. 
The key question that framed this research was: Are public health departments that use 
value-based decision-making more likely to demonstrate and document higher levels of 
preparedness competencies? 
Although this research failed to demonstrate a statistically significant relationship 
between preparedness competency and value-based decision-making, there were some 
findings to indicate that VBDM may be useful in decisions that determine the financing 
of public health preparedness. The ability to analytically demonstrate the benefit of 
public health preparedness might prove beneficial in attracting additional public funding 
as well as private funding. 
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This research pointed to significant problems in the public health preparedness system for 
which there are no easy solutions. Budgets are extremely tight and staffs are strained. 
Most of the public health preparedness funding comes from one federal grant (PHEP) 
that has been declining every year for the last seven years. There is only one national 
program that recognizes preparedness competency and very few LHDs have received 
recognition. During the past several years, a number of public health emergencies ranging 
from pandemics to hurricanes have seriously challenges the preparedness capacity of 
LHDs. A persistent theme in the literature review was the need for local health 
departments to be better prepared to respond to both natural and man-made events.  
Since 9/11, political considerations have dominated homeland security decisions. 
The political model does not consider risk, benefit, or even effectiveness. Instead, large 
sums of public money have been appropriated and spent on homeland projects, 
equipment, and programs without any concrete evidence that they improve our security. 
Very little consideration has been given to using analytical or economic tools that can be 
used to demonstrate effectiveness.  
In the absence of any analytical processes, it is likely that the expenditure of 
public dollars will continue to be determined mostly within the framework of the political 
model. Furthermore, unless an acceptable alternative appears, it is likely that the 
willingness to change to a more innovative rational decision-making model will be 
overshadowed by the coalitions that control homeland security funding policies. 
In contrast to the political model, this thesis developed a value-based model for 
financing public health preparedness. This model is the antithesis of the political model 
because it is built upon the foundations of analytical decision-making. The essential tools 
of value-based decision-making (VBDM), for the purposes of this research, are risk 
assessment, cost-benefit analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis, return on investment, and 
hazard vulnerability analysis. These tools are “value-based” because they provide a 
 xv 
rational basis for evaluating the cost, consequence, and utility of specific funding 
decisions.  
In an effort to understand the relationship between value-based decision-making 
and public health preparedness competency, 500 local health departments were randomly 
drawn using strata to randomly generate numbers.  
This research project was unable to confirm the idea that value-based analytics 
improve the decision-making process for financing public health preparedness. The 
essential components of a new value-based model are national preparedness standards, 
use of common analytics, and political buy-in. Each of these components must overcome 
implementation hurdles before value-based decision-making can be deemed a successful 
alternative to the existing political model.  
This research corroborated the need for system level change but emphasized 
individual departmental programmatic changes related to the investment in the public 
health preparedness infrastructure, the need for a budget and outcome tool, and the use of 
value-based decision-making as an analytical tool for prioritizing spending decisions. 
These changes can be viewed as recommendations that provide the foundation for 
developing a new value-based model for financing public health preparedness. 
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Despite the fact that there has been only one significant terrorist attack since 9/11, 
homeland security spending in the United States has increased by over $1 trillion in the 
last 13 years.1 Why would the United States, its state and local governments, and the 
private sector spend so much money to achieve what risk analyst Howard Kunreuther 
called “only a small reduction in the probability of a terrorist attack?”2  
Since 9/11, political considerations have dominated homeland security decisions. 
The political model does not consider risk, benefit, or even effectiveness. Instead, large 
sums of public money have been appropriated and spent on homeland projects, 
equipment, and programs without any concrete evidence that they improve our security. 
Very little consideration has been given to using analytical or economic tools that can be 
used to demonstrate effectiveness.  
In the absence of any analytical processes, it is likely that the expenditure of 
public dollars will continue to be determined mostly within the framework of the political 
model. Furthermore, unless an acceptable alternative appears, it is likely that the 
willingness to change to a more innovative rational decision-making model will be 
overshadowed by the coalitions that control homeland security funding policies. In his 
book, “The Innovator’s Dilemma,” Clayton Christensen noted that innovation requires a 
new skill set and a new concept of the relevant value network.3 Within the context of 
homeland security, a new concept of a relevant value network would include a different 
approach to analyzing homeland security needs, allocating homeland security dollars, and 
rewarding the coalition that is the homeland security enterprise. Christensen would label 
terrorism as a disruptive innovation that cannot be controlled by sustaining traditional 
decision-making practices. 
1 John E.Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, Terror, Security, and Money: Balancing the Risks, Benefits, 
and Costs of Homeland Security (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
2 Howard Kunreuther, "Risk Analysis and Risk Management in an Uncertain World," Risk Analysis 22 
(2002): 662–663. 
3 Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator's Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause Great Firms to 
Fail (Boston, Mass: Harvard Business School Press, 2000), 842. 
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In The Dictator’s Handbook, Mesquita and Smith identified three groups of 
people who are the power brokers in any given political situation.4 The most important 
group is the actors who make up the “winning coalition.” In the on-going debate 
concerning the funding homeland security, the winning coalition consists of powerful 
members of the U.S. Congress, Governors of our larger states, key federal, state, and 
local officials, and lobbyists for the homeland security industry. All of these parties 
benefit from an irrational funding model that is built upon the premise of high risk and an 
infinite number of potential targets.  
According to Mesquita and Smith, there are three subgroups essential to the 
political dynamic: the “interchangeables,” the “influentials,” and the “essentials.” In the 
battle for homeland security funds, the interchangeables are the upper level 
administrative types, including the department secretary and other politically appointed 
senior executives. The influentials are the President, Governors, and members of 
Congress who hold key leadership positions. The essentials are the staff that implement 
homeland security policies and depend upon continuing appropriations to maintain their 
jobs.  
The interchangeables are conduits of information to the influentials. Within the 
political decision-making model, the interchangeables have divided political loyalties but 
a shared commitment to maintaining or increasing funding for homeland security 
programs. Any change in funding policy is potentially a threat unless the 
interchangeables maintain control of communications. A rational model could enhance 
their political power but that would mean that the influentials would defer to a rational 
process for funding homeland security, hardly a likely scenario. 
The influentials are the ultimate power brokers in the winning coalition. Through 
seniority and expert knowledge, they become recognized as the gatekeepers of all 
appropriation and policy decisions regarding homeland security. Key influentials include 
the President and members of Congress who hold important leadership positions. 
Because homeland security has become one of our highest priority areas, these political 
4 Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior Is 
Almost Always Good Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 4–6. 
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influentials are vested in an appropriations process that distributes resources according to 
a purely political process. Another set of powerful influentials is lobbyists for the 
numerous companies that profit from the massive public dollars spent on homeland 
security. Literally hundreds of companies employ lobbyists to ensure that the billions of 
dollars in homeland security funding remain intact. These lobbyists are very effective in a 
political process controlled by politicians. A more rational decision-making process 
would negatively impact both the politicians and the lobbyists who function well in an 
environment of pork barrel political decision-making.  
The essentials are important to the homeland security funding process because 
they are the line staff that work in career service and implement the policies crafted and 
shaped by the influentials and the interchangeables. These essentials often have many 
years in career service and their collective institutional memories provide the base 
information that influentials and interchangeables need to maintain support for homeland 
security programs. Essentials can be found in the Departments of Homeland Security and 
Health and Human Services, GAO, and the Congressional Research Services. 
In the absence of any analytical processes, it is likely that the expenditure of 
public dollars will continue to be determined mostly within the framework of the political 
model. Furthermore, unless an acceptable alternative gains political favor, it is likely that 
the willingness to change to a more innovative rational decision-making model will be 
overshadowed by the coalitions that control homeland security funding policies.  
Given the predominance of politics in homeland security funding decisions, is 
there a role for what Christensen called value-based strategies? Some work has 
demonstrated the potential of evidence-based quality metrics to improve public response 
to a public health emergency, but it also argued that more investment in improved 
measurement was needed to apply these concepts more broadly.5 More generally, as long 
as policy makers lack the ability to demonstrate a positive return on investment from 
expenditures on emergency preparedness efforts, public health preparedness funding will 
be at risk.  
5 Debra Lotstein et al., "Using Quality Improvement Methods to Improve Public Health Emergency 
Preparedness: Prepare for Pandemic influenza," Health Affairs 27 (2008): 328. 
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This thesis proposes to develop a value-based model for financing public health 
preparedness. This model is the antithesis of the political model because it is built upon 
the foundations of analytical decision-making. The predominance of the political model 
will ensure the continued downward spiral of public health funding because public health 
preparedness has not demonstrated a rational basis for funding support. As funding for 
homeland security has decreased, local public health departments have been hard hit and 
forced lay-offs have become the new normal. Resources for funding public health 
preparedness are scarce, always and everywhere. Accordingly, prioritization of 
expenditures is unavoidable. What criteria should be used to determine the proper 
investment in public health preparedness to assure value for money spent? 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
Our federal, state, and local governments are not investing in the design and 
improvement of strategies for evaluating the costs associated with natural and man-made 
disasters and events. In this era of fiscal conservatism, one of the biggest challenges in 
designing and funding public health preparedness is deciding exactly how much to invest 
and determining the impact of those investments. In an ideal budget world, investments 
in public health preparedness should be analogous to any other public investment in an 
activity that purports to increase public security. According to a recent publication by the 
Institute of Medicine (IOM), “The optimal amount of investment in safety would be 
driven by a rigorous assessment of the expected cost of an event and the effectiveness of 
the prevention activity compared to the cost associated with the activity.”6 
Pines, Pilkington, and Seabury argued that the most fundamental challenge of 
measuring the costs and benefits of public health preparedness is simply agreeing on a 
definition of what it means to be prepared.7 Part of the definition problem is deciding 
which public health activities fall within a definition of “preparedness.” For example, 
6 Jesse Pines, William Pilkington, and Seth Seabury, "Value-Based Models for Sustaining Emergency 
Preparedness Capacity and Capability in the United States," (paper presented at the Institute of Medicine 
Forum on Medical and Public Health Preparedness for Catastrophic Events, Washington, DC, October 30, 
2013), 9. 
7 Ibid., 9. 
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most local public health entities have an epidemiology function but how much of that 
function is devoted to bio-surveillance? Furthermore, there are some public health 
preparedness activities, including training, exercises, and infrastructure improvements 
that are not exclusively public health preparedness activities. For example, local public 
health departments must be ready to provide mass vaccinations on a routine basis as well 
as during a bioterrorism event. This definitional problem makes it difficult to distinguish 
between routine public health activities and activities that are uniquely public health 
preparedness. 
Pines, Pilkington, and Seabury also point out that true public health emergencies 
are extremely rare and that the rarity provides limited opportunities for measuring the 
effectiveness of specific interventions.8 With so few events for comparative analysis, an 
evaluative research model would have difficulty examining the effectiveness of 
investments in infrequent public health preparedness activities against established 
outcomes of more frequent disasters such as hurricanes, tornadoes, and floods. 
Consequently, there is little research that has provided evidence-based measures that 
could be used to impact public policy. Kaji, Langford, and Lewis found that where 
measures of emergency preparedness do exist and are used, these different measures 
provide highly inconsistent assessments of preparedness.9 In order to establish some 
basic principles for evaluation of alternative funding proposals, it is important that there 
be some agreement on the component measures of an effective public health 
preparedness system. As Mueller and Stewart recognized, “policy discussions of 
homeland security are driven not by rigorous analysis but by fear, perception of past 
mistakes, pork-barrel politics, and insistence on an invulnerability that cannot be 
achieved.”10  
8 Ibid., 10.  
9 A.H. Kanji, V. Langford, and R.J. Lewis, "Assessing Hospital Disaster Preparedness: A Comparison 
of an On-Site Survey, Directly Observed Drill Performance, and Video Analysis of Teamwork," Annals of 
Emergency Medicine 52 (2008): 195–201. 
10 Mueller and Stewart, Terror, Security, and Money: Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of 
Homeland Security, 3.  
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There are at least four challenges in measuring the effective use of public health 
preparedness resources: evidence of effectiveness, evidence of method, evidence of smart 
practices, and the availability of locally generated data. Evidence of effectiveness for rare 
events is hard to come by. It is also difficult to capture all the benefits of any specific 
preparedness intervention. There is very little evidence available on best public health 
preparedness practices; and, locally generated data on preparedness outcomes plays a 
very limited role in the decision-making processes, which are driven by federal granting 
authorities.  
However, there are several economic or value for money tools that can help 
decision-making when used and interpreted appropriately. These tools help with value 
judgments, explain costs and benefits and provide a rational choice among competing 
options. Economic tools seek to clarify the costs and benefits of alternative policy options 
and help decision-makers be more aware of the impact of their decisions. They also 
indicate the resources required to achieve a desired level of security. The process and 
discipline of developing economic measures helps to test the assumptions and value 
judgments associated with key financing decisions.  
 Value for money tools are both promising and concerning. The promise lies in 
their potential to analyze the impact of a specific intervention. The concern is that value 
for money tools will become the determining factor influencing the evaluation of 
competing options. No decision should be made on the basis of an economic measure 
alone. Similarly, an intervention should not be excluded simply because it is lacking 
measures or evidence of economic impact.  
The issues that are described here arise intrinsically out of the nature of 
catastrophic risk and human behavior. Unfortunately, that means that there are no easy 
solutions. Ultimately, solving these issues requires both an investment in our ability to 
make accurate predictions about potential losses from an event, and educating the public 
about the need to remain vigilant and protect us. This will require the creation of 
additional knowledge in this area by developing a research agenda to address these 
measurement issues in public health preparedness to assess the right level of funding. 
Until this is accomplished, public health preparedness will always be vulnerable to 
 6 
insufficient and misallocated funding, particularly in times when government revenues 
are low and there is strong competition for limited resources. With declining funding, it is 
vital to look to ways to make better use of the funds that are available, and to present 
potential ways for communities to develop public health preparedness programs that 
demonstrate cost effectiveness.  
Finally, is it possible to measure effectiveness of public health preparedness and 
response grants? In a 2003 study, the General Accounting Office (GAO) concluded that 
there had been measurable improvement in one area, the management of first responders, 
but there remain significant challenges in measuring all other aspects of preparedness and 
response.1112 To date, there has been no definitive study that measures the capability and 
capacity of communities to prevent, prepare, or respond to a terrorist event.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis develops a rigorous scientific model to evaluate the benefit of using 
value-based tools to enhance the effectiveness of public health preparedness programs. 
The key question and sub-questions that frame the research that guides this thesis is: Are 
local public health departments that use value-based decision-making (VBDM) more 
likely to demonstrate and document higher levels of preparedness competencies; and  
• What is VBDM and how is it defined within the context of public health 
preparedness?  
• Does VBDM simply enhance preparedness competency or is it the 
deciding factor?  
The assumption that value-based tools make a difference in preparedness 
effectiveness is neither proven nor tested. However, if these value-based tools can be 
demonstrated to show evidence of improving public health preparedness, it is possible 
that they could have substantial impact on changing the current political decision-making 
model. 
11Government Accountability Office, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Appropriations, House 
of Representatives, GAO-05-121 Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grant Programs 
Has Improved, But Challenges Remain, (Washington, DC: GAO, February, 2005). 
12 Paul L. Psner, GAO-03-1146T Homeland Security Reforming Federal Grants to Better Meet 
Outstanding Needs, (Washington, D.C.: General Accounting Office, 2003). 
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The first sub-question acknowledges that VBDM has different meanings 
depending upon context. For example, VBDM in social work considers the social values 
of both the clients and the service providers. In the field of public preparedness, VBDM 
will be defined within the construct of a process that uses analytical tools to improve 
measurable preparedness performance.  
The second sub-question relates to the utility of VBDM in determining public 
health preparedness policy. If VBDM is only incidental to preparedness competency, 
what then are the critical factors that make one public health entity better prepared?  
We know approximately how much money has been spent on public health 
preparedness and response before and after 9/11. What we do not know is if these 
expenditures have reduced our collective risk or improved preparedness and response 
capability and capacity. Would we have been better off by spending these dollars on 
education or foreign aid and assistance? Unfortunately, we will probably never know the 
answer because opportunity costs were not key considerations in preparedness budget 
decisions in the years following 9/11.   
This research agenda supposes a deterministic causal relationship between the use 
of value-based assessments and improved levels of preparedness and response. In other 
words, if financing decisions are influenced by value-based risk assessments, then we 
would expect a measurable increase in levels of preparedness and response. We know 
this kind of cause/effect relationship is rarely exact though, so we must infer that certain 
conditions must exist for this causal relationship to work. For example, the use of value-
based risk assessment methodologies requires a political environment that supports 
critical enquiry over political expediency. Because, human behavior is never certain, we 




II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
With local public health budgets being ring-fenced, there is increased urgency to 
demonstrate return on investment in relation to public health preparedness interventions 
and explore methods of decision-support for public health preparedness priority setting. It 
is likely LHDs will continue to face significant reductions in federal grants for 
preparedness and as resources shrink, there will be an ever-increasing demand for more 
evidence-based interventions that demonstrably improve preparedness capacity and 
capability. This literature review will examine previous research on VBDM, provide a 
summary of the history of public health preparedness funding, explain the utility of 
VBDM tools such as cost-effectiveness analysis, cost-benefit analysis, and return on 
investment, and examine the use of VBDM in public health. 
A. VBDM AS A RESEARCH TOPIC 
VBDM is not a new concept. In the field of neurosciences, VBDM refers to a 
body of knowledge that attempts to explain the biological basis of human behaviors.13 In 
the law profession, VBDM refers to decisions that are rule-based.14 Health and medicine 
are somewhat recent in adopting VBDM. In order to augment their decision support 
systems, health care institutions have begun pursuing evidence-based decisions that 
enhance therapeutic and diagnostic patient outcomes.15 At this time, there is no evidence 
in this literature review that local public health agencies have been eager to adopt VBDM 
and even less evidence that VBDM where used has resulted in the establishment of  
 
13 Antonio Rangel, Colin Camerer, and P. Read Montague, "A Framework for Studying the 
Neurobiology of Value-Based Decision Making," Nature Reviews Neuroscience 9 (2008), 545. 
14 Frederick F. Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-
Making in Law and in Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). 
15 M. G. Myriam Hunink, Decision Making in Health and Medicine, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004), 2. 
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thresholds that accurately demonstrate the relationship between costs and effects that an 
intervention must achieve to be considered successful.16  
However, in 2013, IOM published a promising paper that laid the framework for 
how state and local public health agencies could implement value-based approaches to 
decisions regarding the financing of public health preparedness. The paper was entitled 
“Value-Based Models for Sustaining Emergency Preparedness Capacity and Capability 
in the United States,” and made seven recommendations to provide “a roadmap for 
enhancing the sustainability of preparedness efforts in the United States.”17 The 
recommendations included a call for a national preparedness research agenda, alternative 
ways for distributing preparedness grant funding, clear metrics for determining 
preparedness grant effectiveness, and new mechanisms for financing local preparedness 
efforts. The paper concluded with the admonition that irrespective of successful financing 
models, “local, state, and federal governments still bear the ultimate responsibility to 
ensure that all communities in the United States are prepared for public health 
emergencies.”18 
B. PREPAREDNESS GRANT FUNDING   
Prior to September 11, 2001, state and local governments received grants for 
emergency preparedness through three grant programs: the State Domestic Preparedness 
Program (SDPP) administered by the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Emergency 
Management Performance Grant (EMPG) administered by the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), and the Metropolitan Medical Response System (MMRS) 
administered by the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS). SDPP, EMPG, 
and MMRS grants were brought under the control of the newly created Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) in 2002. Four additional grant programs were established and 
also placed within the control of DHS. These four programs were the Urban Areas 
16 Hans-Georg Eichler et al., "Use of Cost-Effectiveness Analysis in Health-Care Resource Allocation 
Decision-Making: How Are Cost-Effectiveness Thresholds Expected to Emerge," Value in Health 7 
(2004): 519.  
17 Pines, Pilkington, and Seabury, "Value-Based Models for Sustaining Emergency Preparedness 
Capacity and Capability in the United States," 25-28. 
18 Ibid., 27-28. 
 10 
                                                 
Security Initiative (UASI), State Homeland Security Program (SHSP), Law Enforcement 
Terrorism Prevention Program (LETPP), and the Citizen Corps Program (CCP). In 
addition to these four programs, DHHS administered two key grant programs: the Public 
Health Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) funds and the ASPR Hospital Preparedness 
Program (HPP).  
Immediately after 9/11, we saw huge increases in federal funds available to state 
and local governments for emergency preparedness. State and local governments built 
and equipped homeland security infrastructures with these monies and became almost 
totally dependent upon the federal government for funding their homeland security 
initiatives. The sharp increases occurred between the years 2002 and 2007. The Great 
Recession began in 2008 and resulted in drastic reductions in federal funding, forcing 
state and local governments to make draconian cuts in disaster and emergency 
preparedness programs.  
DHS administered the five key grant programs to state and local governments 
during the period 2002–2007. These programs were: UASI, SHSP, LETPP, MMRS, and 
CCP. The total appropriation for these five programs increased from $315.7 million in 
FY 2002 to $1.66 billion in FY 2007. Table 1 displays the funding distribution and shows 
that the highest DHS funding occurred in FY 2004 at $2.9 billion. UASI targets eligible 
“high-threat, high-density” urban areas to help them prevent, protect, respond, and 
recover from acts of terrorism. Forty-five urban areas qualified in FY 2007 and six of our 
major cities received $441 million of the total $746.9 million allocated to UASI by DHS. 
From FY 2003 to FY 2007 UASI funding totaled 3.57 billion dollars. 
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Table 1.   Homeland Security Grant Program Funding Distribution for FY 
2002 to FY 2007 (in millions) 
SHSP are DHS grants to states, District of Columbia, and U.S. territories, to 
improve their homeland security capabilities. Awards are based on a risk analysis 
formula with each state guaranteed a minimum of 0.75 percent of the total funding 
available. SHSP dollars were $315.7 million in 2002 and peaked at $2.06 billion in 2003. 
From 2002–2007, the federal government awarded over $6.15 billion in SHSP grants.  
LETPP is the third highest funding program administered by DHS and is intended 
to improve law enforcement’s ability to prevent terrorism activities. Fusion Centers were 
created with this funding to improve coordination of emergency sector operations in 
major metropolitan areas. LETPP funding began in 2004 and has declined in every 
subsequent fiscal year budget. LETPP funds total over $1.63 billion dollars from FY 
2004–FY 2007. The minimum allocation was 0.75 percent of the total funding available 
in the fiscal year.  
MMRS is the only DHS program whose funding increased in FY 2007. MMRS is 
designed to help local emergency response to an “all-hazards mass casualty incident.” 
MMRS funds totaled $135.32 million from FY 2004–FY 2007. Just 124 cities are eligible 
for MMRS funds and each city received $258,145.  
CCP grants are the smallest program administered by DHS. Each state received 
0.75 of the total funding available of $119.5 million in FY 2007. CCP is a program that 
provides funding to encourage public and private partnerships in addressing emergency 





FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005  FY 2006  FY 2007 Total 
UASI   - $596.4 $671.0 $854.7 $710.6 $746.9 $3,579.5 
SHSP $315.7 $2,066.3 $1,675.1 $1,062.3 $528.2 $509.3 $6,156.8 
LETPP       -              - $497.1 $386.3 $384.1 $363.8 $1,631.2 
MMRS           -              - $46.3 $28.2 $28,8 $32.0 $135.3 
CCP           - $37.5 $34.8 $13.5 $19.2 $14.6 $119.6 
Total $315.7 $2,700.2 $2,924.2 $2,344.9 $1,670.9 $1,666.5 $11,622.4 
Source: Homeland Security Grant Program, U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
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From 2002–2003, DHS funding for these five programs increased from $315.7 
million to $ 2.1 billion, an amazing 554 percent growth in one year. This increase could 
be attributed to the events of 9/11 and a sense of urgency to prevent future terrorist 
attacks. Total funds available began declining in FY 2004 and by FY 2005; nearly all 
states had experienced a 22 percent decline in total DHS funds.19 
The primary source of public health funding for state, local, tribal, and territorial 
health departments has been the PHEP funds that have been administered through the 
DHHS and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and Prevention (CDC). Since 
2002, PHEP has granted almost $9 billion for health departments to strengthen their 
emergency preparedness and response capabilities.  
In FY 2013, the fifty states and territories received $584.69 million in PHEP 
funding down from the $619.44 million received in FY2012. In 2008, PHEP funds 
totaled $704.86 million. The decline in funding from 2008 to 2013 has been slightly over 
17 percent. 
The consequences of the loss of PHEP funds have been immediate and 
measurable. The emergency preparedness capability of the public health sector has been 
severely impacted. In the 10th Annual Ready or Not? Protecting the Public from 
Diseases, Disasters, 35 states and Washington, D.C., scored a six or lower on 10 key 
indicators of public health preparedness.20 The report includes these findings: 
• Twenty-nine states cut public health funding from fiscal years 2010–11 to 
2011–12. 
• Federal funds for state and local preparedness have been reduced 38 
percent for the period 2005–2012. 
• Twenty-three states have cut public health funding for two consecutive 
years and fourteen have cut public health funding for three years in a row. 
19 Sujit CanagaRetna and Jeremy Williams, "Innovative Programs in Funding State Homeland 
Security Needs," A Special Report of the Southern Legislative Conference, The Council of State 
Governments, 2007, 8. 
20Jeffrey Levi et al., Ready or Not? Protecting the Public's Health from Diseases, Disasters, and 
Bioterrorism - 2012, Washington, D.C.: Trust for America's Health, 2012. Accessed February 12, 2014, 
http://www.healthyamericans.org/assets/files/TFAH2012ReadyorNot10.pdf. 
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• Since 2008, state and local health departments have lost over 45,000 jobs 
 While there are fewer funds available for emergency preparedness, response and 
recovery, DHS did approve more than $1.3 billion for FY 2012 for preparedness grants to 
further enhance critical infrastructure protection activities. In addition, DHHS approved 
over $971 million in PHEP and HPP grants for this same fiscal year. Table 2 outlines 
several grant opportunities funded by DHS, DHHS and other federal agencies that are 
available to assist state, local, and tribal governments with preparedness, response and 
recovery efforts. 




 Federal Agency  
 
 
 Description  
 
 
 Further Information  
 
 
 Department of 




 FEMA Grants Program 
Directorate provides a 
general overview on 
Preparedness (Non-
Disaster Grants), Disaster 
Grants, Grants 
Management Toolkit, & 
State Administrative 
Agency Contacts List  
Specific programs include:  
DHS State Homeland 
Security Program (SHSP)  
State Administrative 
Agencies can apply for 
SHSP funds to address 
needs in planning, training, 
and evaluation to support 
protection, response, and 
recovery from acts of 
terrorism).  
DHS Urban Areas 
Security Initiative (UASI)  
State Administrative 
Agencies can apply for 
UASI funds to address 
similar needs as outlined in 
the SHSP, but are limited 
to high-threat, high-density 
urban areas specifically 








Department of Health & 
Human Services  
(HHS)  
Grants.gov  
HHS is the managing partner 
for this website that provides 
all discretionary grants offered 
by the 26 federal grant-making 
agencies.  
Office of the Assistant 
Secretary for Preparedness 







Preparedness Program  
Provides grants to assist states, 
territories, and four of the 
nation’s largest metropolitan 
areas with improving surge 
and response capacity, 
improving preparedness plans, 
and enhancing capabilities of 
their healthcare systems; links 
to technical assistance guides 
and reports to further enhance 
disaster planning also 
available.  
Centers for Disease Control 
and Prevention Public Health 
Emergency Preparedness 
Cooperative Agreements  
Provides funding to state, 
local, tribal and territorial 
public health departments to 
enhance their ability to 
respond to public health 
threats, including natural 
disasters.  
Substance Abuse and Mental 
Health Services 
Administration Crisis 
Counseling Assistance and 
Training Program  
Implemented by FEMA and 
provides funding to states, 
U.S. territories, and federally 
recognized tribes to assist 
disaster survivors with mental 
health and counseling services.  
Department of Energy 
(DOE)  
 
Manages several grant 
programs to protect and 
enhance the efficiency and 
resilience of the U.S. energy 
infrastructure; these grants 
include funds to improve 
technologies, methodologies, 
and state and regional energy 
emergency exercises to 
evaluate capabilities and 
assess current vulnerabilities 
to energy infrastructure and 
supply systems.  
Specific programs include:  
Global Threat Reduction 
Initiative  
This program administered by 
the National Nuclear Security 
Administration helps the 
Department of Energy prevent 
the acquisition of nuclear and 
radiological materials for use 
in weapons of mass 
destruction as outlined in the 
Nuclear Security Goal 
(2.2.44). The three 
subprograms, Convert, 
Remove, and Protect, further 
support the protection of 
nuclear and radiological 





Department of Interior  The Bureau of Indian Affairs http://www.bia.gov/  
 15 
(DOI)  provides grants to Indian tribes 
and tribal organizations to 
maintain and manage critical 
infrastructure such as dams 
and power facilities; manages 
a grant program for the 
Irrigation, Power, and Safety 
of Dams.  
 
 
Department of Justice 
(DOJ)  
 
Provides funding opportunities 
to help reduce crime and 
promote justice that address 
the needs of communities and 
criminal justice professionals, 
particularly at the state and 
local levels; previously 
managed the Domestic Anti-
Terrorism Technology 









Provides grants to State, local, 
territorial, and tribal entities to 
enhance hazardous materials 
emergency planning and 
training by conducting 
exercises and analyses; there 
are additional pipeline safety 




For more information on the DHS FY 2013 Budget and the National Preparedness Grant Program, visit 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/mgmt/dhs-budget-in-brief-fy2013.pdf.   
 
C. WHAT IS VBDM? 
The essential tools of VBDM, for the purposes of this research, are risk 
assessment (RA), cost benefit analysis (CBA), cost effectiveness analysis (CEA), return 
on investment (ROI), and hazard vulnerability analysis (HVA). These tools are “value-
based” because they provide a rational basis for evaluating the cost, consequence, and 
utility of specific funding decisions. This literature review examined these measures, 
their strengths and weaknesses, and made some estimates of which measures may be 
most useful in analytical decision-making. Figure 1 provides a visual representation of 
the concept of VBDM used in this thesis. 
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Figure 1.  VBDM Framework 
1. Risk Assessment 
Within the scope of preparedness, risk assessment includes a combination of 
sequential actions that assess the threat likelihood, set level of acceptable risk, and 
establish limits of how much threat is likely to be reduced by a specific security 
measure.21 Risk assessment tries to improve decision-making by using risk assessment 
methodology in place of an assumption that the only scenario is the worst possible 
outcome. Risk analyst Kip Viscusi cautions that using risk analysis in homeland security 
is difficult because “we don’t have good numbers and if you can’t assess the likelihood of 
a terrorist attack or how deadly it is going to be, it is really hard to say how much you 
should spend to try to prevent it.”22 Recently, DHS has begun using risk assessment 
methodology to estimated target vulnerability and attack consequences and likelihood of 
an attack to determine if a possible target should be protected.23 The risk assessment 
equation can be modified as follows to fit into the realm of an analytical tool for 
examining public health preparedness: 
21 Mueller and Stewart, Terror, Security, and Money: Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of 
Homeland Security, 13. 
22 Aaron Steelman, "Interview: W. Kip Viscusi," Economic Focus, (Richmond: Federal Reserve Bank, 
2007), 40–45. 
23 Todd Masse, O'Neil Siobhan, and John Rollins, The Department of Homeland Security's Risk 
Assessment Methodology: Evolution, Issues, and Options for Congress, (Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service, 2007), 6. 
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• Risk = (probability of a successful manmade attack) x (losses sustained 
from a manmade attack) 
Risk assessment is an alternative to worst case thinking because it includes both 
benefits and rewards.24 Unlike worst case thinking, risk assessment does not assume all 
hazards are potentially possible and must be addressed. Such flawed thinking resulted in 
the huge increases in homeland security funding immediately after 9/11.  
2. Cost-Benefit Analysis 
On the other hand, CBA provides a vehicle for evaluating competing options. 
CBA seeks to compare the costs with doing something, to the benefits that derive from 
that something. The principle of cost-benefit analysis is rather simple and can be 
described as follows: 
• If we must decide between options A and option B, A will be selected if 
the net benefits of A are greater than the net benefits of B. 
However, calculating benefits is not always easy. For example, in considering 
whether or not to fund a new bioterrorism program, it is assumed that the benefit is the 
savings in lives and properties generated by implementing a specific intervention. The 
cost-benefit ratio requires these calculations: 
• Benefits (gained by new terrorism prevention initiative)/Costs (new 
terrorism prevention initiative) = Benefit-to-Cost Ratio.  
For example, if the benefit of the new initiative is $5 million and the cost is $1 
million, the benefit to cost ratio is 5 to 1. Therefore, in this example, every dollar spent 
would generate five dollars in benefits. 
3. Cost-Effectiveness Analysis 
Cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA) looks at spending decisions in terms of 
justifying expenses against demonstrated impact. In other words, if a dollar spent on 
homeland security has zero impact on improving security, it could be argued that the 
24 Mueller and Stewart, Terror, Security, and Money: Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of 
Homeland Security, 15. 
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expenditure is not cost effective. Maynard captures the value of CEA in this quote, “What 
is effective may not be cost effective, but what is cost effective is always effective.”25 
The use of CEA in preparedness financing decisions could be beneficial in guiding 
budgeting decisions in response to rapidly increasing budgetary constraints. There are 
some excellent examples of using CEA in preparedness planning and resource allocation. 
Kaufmann, Meltzer, and Schmid used CEA to quantify the cost of a bioterrorist attack 
and concluded that a post attack prophylaxis program is the single most important means 
of reducing loss of lives.26 Other research has assessed the cost-effectiveness of pre-
attack and post attack strategies for dealing with a large-scale anthrax event and 
concluded that cost-effectiveness depended heavily on the probability of an attack and the 
potential number of people exposed during the attack.27 Unlike CBA, CEA is not 
monetized and yields a cost-effectiveness ratio using the following formula: 
 Cost Effectiveness Ratio = Total Costs/Units of Effectiveness 
For example, estimating the cost effectiveness ratio of a specific intervention 
intended to circumvent the effects of a terrorist attack would yield a ratio interpreted as 
dollars per life saved, injuries prevented, or reduced property damage. The cost-
effectiveness ratio allows the analyst to rank order interventions on a scale from least 
effective to most effective. Unfortunately, it is difficult for policy makers to know 
whether differences in costs and effects are actually connected to differences in the 
efficiency of interventions.28 Figure 2 is a pictorial description of the CEA process: 
 25 A. Maynard, "Evidence-Based Medicine: An Incomplete Method for Informing Treatment 
Choices," Lancet 349 (1997): 126. 
26 A.F. Kaufmann, M.I. Meltzer, and G.P.Schmid, "The Economic Impact of A Bioterrorist Attack: 
Are Prevention and Postattack Intervention Programs Justifiable?" Emerging Infectious Disease 3 (1997): 
93. 
27 R.A. Fowler, "Cost-Effectiveness of Defending Against Bioterrorism: A Comparison of 
Vaccination and Antibiotic Prophylaxis Against Anthrax," Annals of Internal Medicine 142 (2005): 601.   
28 T. Tan-Torres Edejer, R. Baltussen, T. Adam, R. Hutubessy, A. Acharya, D.B. Evans, and C.J.L. 
Murray, eds. Making Choices in Health: WHO Guide to Cost-Effectiveness Analysis, Geneva: World 
Health Organization, 2003, 17. 
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Figure 2.  CEA Process 
4. Return on Investment  
ROI is more rigorous than CBA because it allows for the consideration of the time 
value of money and seeks to determine which costs and benefits produce a desirable 
financial outcome. To calculate simple ROI, the benefit of an investment is divided by 
the cost of the investment using the following formula: 
ROI = (Gain from Investment – Cost of Investment) 
Cost of Investment 
This simple ROI calculation is less accurate when the investments and/or benefits 
involve future years-as they do with homeland security funding decisions-because future 
dollars are worth less than current dollars. The general rule for greater accuracy is to use 
the discounted ROI calculation method when the investments and/or the benefits involve 
future years. First, the analyst must establish a baseline of current performance so before 
and after comparisons can be reliably calculated. The second step is to measure the 
change in performance from the baseline that resulted from the investment and the 
change that resulted from other factors other than the investment. The third step involves 
using present value data to calculate ROI. 
To complete an ROI calculation where the objective is to reduce the number of 
deaths occurring from a terrorism event, a commonly used measure is the value of a 
statistical life (VSL). However, estimates of VSL are wide-ranging across federal 
agencies as well as by different economists and statisticians. For example, current Office 
of Management and Budget (OMB) guidance suggests that VSL estimates range from $1 
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million to $10 million. One DHS analysis suggested a VSL of $6.5 million (in 1990 
dollars) be used in placing a monetary value on a human life.29  
5. Hazard Vulnerability Analysis 
Hazard vulnerability analysis (HVA) is very similar to what Ted Lewis calls 
model-based vulnerability analysis (MBVA).30 According to Lewis, this model answers 
the questions, “What is worth protecting?” and “How much should be spent?”31 HVA is 
an important analytical tool for understanding the risk and costs associated with a specific 
target of terrorism. Although the steps vary from one emergency responder to another, 
the basic HVA sequence follows a similar pattern beginning with determining probability 
and impact of hazard probability, then ranks impact on a scale from low to moderate to 
high.  
For example, in Florida, hurricanes are a constant seasonal threat. An HVA for 
hurricanes would include a probability assessment, including but not limited to, known 
risk and historical data. The likelihood of a hurricane would be scored low, medium, or 
high. Other threats like wildfires, epidemics, and floods are also scored and the average 
score is used to determine which of the threats that are most likely. So, if the average 
score for hurricanes in a particular locale is highest in the month of September, and the 
average score for wildfires in the same month is lower, the analyst can predict that 
hurricanes are a much greater risk in September than are wildfires.  
The formula for HVA is as follows: (Threat x Vulnerability) x Consequences = 
Risk. 
Threat is defined as the probability of an event like a hurricane or wildfire 
impacting a specific locale. The potential human, property, and business impact of a 
specific hazardous event provides measures of vulnerability. Consequences are measured 
in terms of preparedness response, remediation, and recovery.  
29 Lisa A. Robinson, Valuing Mortality Risk Reductions in Homeland Security Regulatory Analyses, 
Final Report, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Department of Homeland Security, June, 2008.   
30 Ted Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security: Defending a Networked Nation 
(Hoboken NJ: Wiley-Interscience, 2006), 145. 
31 Ibid., 146. 
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Hospitals and community health centers are required to conduct an annual HVA. 
Public health departments are not required to do a HVA but the results of this research 
indicate that many LHDs include critical components of hazard vulnerability analysis in 
their preparedness planning.  
Terry Cannon questions the viability of HVA noting that such analysis is suspect 
because of “vulnerability conditions of human systems.”32 Cannon is referring to the fact 
that disasters in low population areas have less impact than disasters affecting heavily 
populated areas. In other words, the population at risk, not the disaster itself, becomes the 
focal point of the analysis.  
In the final analysis, all of these VBDM tools can give policy makers some 
concrete ways to measure preparedness, understand which data is most important, and 
make “business case” choices among competing alternatives. At the same time, the users 
of the data can manipulate these tools for political purposes. In addition, the adaptation of 
these tools for use in the public health preparedness context has produced mixed results. 
The next section describes how these decision-support tools have been applied to public 
health in general and specifically to public health preparedness.  
D. VBDM AND PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS  
In June 1999, a meeting of national experts was convened to determine which 
biological agents posed the greatest risks to the public and to develop criteria for 
prioritizing public health preparedness efforts.33 This report provided the foundation for 
the use of risk analysis in preparedness planning and identified the specific risk factors 
and weighting criteria that have become common VBDM tools. Why did public health 
become more interested in VBDM? 
Achieving public health security in the 21st Century is suddenly much more 
complicated than it was in previous times. In the 1900s, public health used scientific and 
32 Terry Cannon, "Vulnerability Analysis and the Explanation of ‘Natural’Disasters," Disasters, 
Development and Environment (1994): 13–30. 
33 M. Meselson and J. Guillemin, "Public Health Assessment of Potential Biological Terrorism 
Agents," Emerging Infectious Diseases, 8 (2002): 225. 
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statistical approaches to eradicate smallpox and limit the broad population health effects 
of such dreaded diseases as polio, measles, whooping cough, and cholera. Cost-benefit 
analysis was the favored analytical tool and it was used as far back as the 19th century to 
“weigh the probability of disease outbreaks against the probability of adverse effects 
from immunizations.”34 CBA continues to prove invaluable in planning and executing 
responses to problems where historical information is readily available.  
In this new millennium, the public health system is confronted with novel, 
incurable viruses like Ebola and HIV/AIDs, difficult to treat bacterium like MERSA, and 
the constant threat that bioterrorism may be used against civilian populations. Against 
this ominous backdrop, public health analysts have been experimenting with analytical 
tools that do not depend entirely on historical data.  
The 2002–2003 Smallpox Vaccination Program clearly illustrates the difficulties 
encountered when using these new predictive analytical VBDM tools. The program was 
initiated without a cost-benefit analysis because no historical data existed to support the 
decision. Instead, the decision was supported by a combination of CEA and HVA. The 
implementation of the plan was plagued almost immediately by adverse medical 
reactions and overwhelming public resistance. Critics were quick to point out that the risk 
of smallpox was less than the risk of the smallpox vaccine. As a result, the vaccination 
program became a monumental failure.  
The Smallpox Vaccination Program failed because it was an attempt to disrupt the 
prevailing public health values through innovative thinking. This new paradigm relied on 
metrics that provided solutions to problems that had not yet appeared, in this case a 
vaccination program for a disease that was eradicated almost 40 years ago.  
 Although this literature review did not uncover an abundance of examples using 
the new metrics, there are some relatively recent examples that have been applied to both 
public health and preparedness issues. Beginning in the 1990s, Paalman and her research 
34 Stephen J.Collier and Andrew Lakeoff, "The Problem of Securing Health," Biosecurity 
Interventions: Global Health and Security In Question (2008): 13. 
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partners argued that economic analysis be used to establish priorities for spending public 
health dollars.35 More recently, Chretien and others suggested that new public health 
surveillance systems might replace the old query systems with dynamic real time 
response systems.36 A 2007 publication illustrated the utility of using CEA in 
determining the relative value of using travel restrictions to control pandemic flu.37 The 
authors concluded that air travel restrictions might delay the spread of a pandemic at 
minimal cost to the economy. Barnett and her colleagues took a systematic analytic 
approach to pandemic influenza preparedness planning using a Haddon matrix to 
demonstrate opportunities for prevention and mitigation prior to a global outbreak.38  
Therefore, the new VBDM tools are being employed and even succeeding to 
varying degrees. The new public health problems, especially those associated with certain 
diseases and terrorism, have created innovative disruptions that cannot wait for historical 
analytical data. Consequently, public health is beginning to realize that novel public 
health threats require novel analytical approaches.  
This literature review demonstrated that VBDM tools have been used in analyzing 
the viability of various vaccination programs. Hopefully, this research may encourage 
public health analysts to explore additional opportunities for using VBDM in 
preparedness decision-making.  
35 Maria Paalman, Henk Bekedam, Laura Hawken, and David Nyheim, "Critical Review of Priority 
Setting in the Health Sector: The Methodology of the 1993 World Development Report," Health Policy and 
Planning 13 (1998): 13–31. 
36 Jean-Paul Chretien, Nancy E.Tomich, Joel C. Gaydos, Patrick Kelley, "Real-Time Public Health 
Surveillance for Emergency Preparedness," American Journal of Public Health 99 (2009): 1361. 
37 Joshua M. Epstein et al., "Controlling Pandemic Flu: The Value of International Air Travel 
Restrictions," Plos One 5 (2007): 1. 
38 Daniel J.Barnett et al., "A Systematic Analytic Approach to Pandemic Influenza Preparedness 
Planning," Plos Medicine, 2 (2005): 1240. 
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III. HYPOTHESES AND PROPOSITIONS 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question is: Are local public health departments that use 
value-based decision-making (VBDM) more likely to demonstrate and document higher 
levels of preparedness competencies? This research includes the following sub-questions: 
• What is VBDM and how is it defined within the context of public health 
preparedness? 
• Does VBDM simply enhance preparedness competency or is it the 
deciding factor?  
We have already addressed the first sub-question in the literature review so the 
focus of the next two chapters will be on further addressing the primary question and sub-
question two. 
B. HYPOTHESES 
The null hypothesis and the null hypothesis can be stated as follows: 
• Ho: Any association between preparedness competency and VBDM 
occurs purely by chance. 
• H1: There is a non-random association between preparedness competency 
and VBDM. 
C. PROPOSITIONS 
If the theory that value-based decision-making (VBDM) improves public health 
preparedness is correct, the following propositions should be supported:  
• Proposition 1: LHDs using VBDM should rank higher among respondents 
that are PPHR recognized. 
• Proposition 2: LHDs that do not use VBDM should rank lower among 
respondents that are PPHR recognized. 
• Proposition 3: LHDs that use VBDM should rank higher among non-
PPHR respondents. 
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• Proposition 4: LHDs that do not use VBDM should rank lower among 
non-PPHR respondents. 
The next step in this research design is to collect data to support or refute each of 
these propositions and the hypotheses. The data will then be analyzed against the four 
propositions and inferences will be drawn regarding the hypothesis that value-based 
financing improves preparedness and response.  
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IV. METHODOLOGY 
A. SAMPLE SELECTION  
The methodology chapter describes the essential components of a nation-wide 
survey designed to collect key information from 500 randomly selected local health 
departments. The survey respondents were drawn from a pool of over 2500 local health 
departments that are members of NACCHO. The survey was distributed in three ways to 
ensure the confidentiality and anonymity of the respondents. In larger states such as 
Virginia, Ohio and Florida, the statewide public health preparedness coordinator was 
contacted via email and asked to send the survey to the randomly selected departments in 
that state. In larger cities and counties, the survey link was sent directly to the attention of 
the public health officer. Finally, in the remaining departments, an email was sent directly 
to the department to the attention of the preparedness coordinator based upon contact 
information obtained from each department’s website.  
To achieve some confidence in the results of this research required a large sample 
of local public health departments due to the significant differences in these departments 
from state to state. For example, in some states, local public health departments (LHDs) 
are state government entities (Virginia, South Carolina, and Florida among others). In 
other states, local public health departments are autonomous units of local government 
(North Carolina). Hawaii and Rhode Island were excluded from this sample because the 
state and local health department are one and the same. A large sample was essential 
under these circumstances to control for the effects of organizational structure on 
performance and effectiveness. All 500 LHDs received the survey via email using Survey 
Monkey. 
Because this researcher cannot observe cause, there must be valid inferences that 
support the causal relationship. In this case, there are several inferences that must be 
considered within this research design. First among these inferences is the idea that 
PPHR status provides demonstrated evidence of preparedness. Next, it is assumed that 
essential components of value-based analysis are CBA, RA, CEA, ROI, and HVA. It also 
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assumed that “the best prepared” public health entities have employed at least one or 
more of these components.  
A 2x2 contingency table (Table 3) will be used to analyze the results. There are 
four cells, with the vertical axis measuring preparedness competency and the horizontal 
axis measuring the use/none use of VBDM.  
Table 3.   2x2 Contingency Table 
 Use VBDM Do Not Use 
VBDM 
PPHR Recognized a b 
Not PPHR Recognized c d 
 
B. SURVEY MEASURING USE OF VALUE-BASED STRATEGIES        
The survey is the key component of this research. From the list of 2532 LHDs 
identified in NACCHO’s Profile of Local Health Departments, the sample was selected 
using a random number generator. The sampling frame was placed into an Excel 
spreadsheet. The random selection was achieved using the following steps: 
• Adding a new column within the spreadsheet and naming it random 
number 
• Copying and pasting the first cell to other cells for this column of 2500 
plus departments. 
• Sorting the records by random number column. 
• Choosing the first 500 departments. Those became the random 500 out of 
2532 departments. 
The survey was open from August 25 to September 25, 2014. One hundred thirty-
eight respondents started and 130 completed the survey.  
The on-line survey was comprised of the fourteen questions listed in Appendix A. 
During pretest on some likely users, the survey took an average of fifteen minutes from 
start to completion. The survey is divided into four sections, each with a specific purpose. 
Although the survey was carefully designed to protect the identity and confidentiality of 
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the respondents, it was intended that the surveys would be completed by a knowledgeable 
person within the department.  
C. DATA COLLECTION 
The data collection was driven by a deductive approach that tested the theory that 
preparedness can be enhanced by value-based decisions. The first question was actually 
not a question but an informed consent for participation in the survey. It assured the 
respondent that their identity would be protected and their responses remain anonymous 
and confidential. 
Questions two through five were used for classification purposes so that 
departments might be compared and contrasted. Question six answered which 
departments have been PPHR recognized by NACCHO. PPHR recognition indicates a 
basic level of public health preparedness. Question seven attempted to measure the scope 
and nature of essential preparedness activities by respondent. Questions eight through 
thirteen provided information on which departments are using VBDM in their 
preparedness budget decision processes. The final question asked each respondent to 
subjectively rank his or her department’s preparedness level.  
D. DATA ANALYSIS 
The Pearson Chi-square test was used to examine the significance of the 
association (contingency) between preparedness competency (PPHR certification) and the 
use of VBDM in financing public health preparedness. After testing for statistical 
significance using Chi-square, the null hypothesis will either be accepted or rejected. 
E. BIAS CONCERNS 
This survey has several potential points where human bias may affect the validity 
of the survey results. First of all, the selected respondents are departments not 
individuals. Because of the survey collection methods, there is no way to know which 
person in a department actually completed the survey. Because this survey depends upon 
a respondent’s expert knowledge of local public health preparedness, not knowing the 
level of respondent qualifications may influence the credibility of the response. Second, 
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the design of the survey itself is affected by the survey designer’s opinions, knowledge, 
and assumptions. Lastly, the researcher’s understanding and interpretation of the data 




A. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
1. Frequency 
In order to analyze the data from the surveys it is helpful to view the data in 
frequency distributions. The survey is attempting to measure a number of variables and 
the frequency distribution shows all the values that a variable can take. For example, one 
of the variables being measured in the survey is the size of the preparedness staff in 
respondent departments. The first step is to list all the values this variable can take within 
a range of values. The number of observations is entered corresponding to a specific 
staffing range.  
Table 4 illustrates a frequency distribution for preparedness staff among the 126 
respondents. All the values for staffing size or any other variable are listed from lowest to 
highest even though there may be no values for a particular variable. Of the 126 
responses to this question, 108 respondents had less than five full-time equivalent 
employees and all had less than 25 full-time equivalent preparedness employees. This 
could lead to a conclusion that most of the respondents represent small LHDs, but Table 
6 reveals that well over half of the respondents represent populations over 100,000.  
Table 4.   Frequency Distribution for Preparedness Staffing Size 
Staff Size Number of Departments 
< 5  FTEs 108 
5–10  FTEs 16 
11–-24  FTEs 2 
25–99  FTEs 0 
100–249  FTEs 0 
250–499  FTEs 0 
>  500  FTEs 0 
Total Departments 126 
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Table 5 shows the frequency distribution of respondents that are PPHR 
recognized and includes several interesting observations. Most interesting is the fact that 
12 of the respondents were unsure as to whether or not their LHDs were PPHR 
recognized. This could indicate that these 12 respondents were either new to the job or 
lacking basic knowledge about their own preparedness programs. Fortunately, these were 
a small number of total respondents and should not have adversely affected the survey 
results. The proportion of PPHR recognized versus not PPHR recognized respondents 
differs dramatically from the overall national results. This finding will be discussed later 
in this chapter.  







Yes 44 0.35 
No 70 0.56 
Not Sure 12 0.09 
Total 126 1.00 
 
2. Central Tendency 
Central Tendency measures where the distribution’s most typical value is located. 
The three most used measures are the mode, median, and mean. Because the survey 
questions are categorical, the measurement scale is nominal and the best measure of the 
best measure of the most typical value is the mode. Ordinal, interval, and ratio 
measurement scales are better suited for mean and medium measures of central tendency. 
The mode is useful in dealing with categorical data because it allows the researcher to 
identify the most likely answer. For example, the survey question regarding population 





Table 6.   Population Served By Number of Responses 
Population Served Number of 
Respondents 









Total Respondents 130 
 
 The mode or most likely respondent serves a population between 100,000 and 
249,999. This population served will be the tallest column on a histogram or the peak of a 
line chart. Since the same data is already in the frequency distribution, the numbers have 
already been counted. However, the mode is not the frequency of the number that occurs 
most often. The mode is the category that has the highest frequency. According to the 
2013 National Profile, 72 percent of the LHDs in the nation serve populations under 
25,000. The average respondent in the survey serves much larger populations. This 
difference is significant and indicates that the average respondent does not represent the 
typical LHD.   
B. SURVEY SECTION: CLASSIFICATION 
Survey questions two through five asked the respondents a series of questions to 
determine the type of public health jurisdiction, population served, size of preparedness 
budget, and number of employees dedicated to preparedness activities. Table 7 displays 
the various jurisdictions represented by the respondent health departments. The county 
health department was by far the most common (mode of 98) jurisdiction in almost the 
same distribution as represented in the 2013 National Profile of Local Health 
Departments.39 Because county health departments are proportionally represented among 
39 "Project Public Health Ready Recognized Agencies," National Association of County and City 
Health Officials, accessed December 12, 2013, http://nacho.org/topics/emergency/PPHR/index.cfm. 
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the survey respondents, the survey results could adequately reflect the preparedness 
programs of county health departments, the majority of health jurisdictions in the 
country, even if they don’t reflect the average population served by LHDs. City or town 
health departments were only a small number (6) of the total responses. City and town 
health departments do not typically provide a wide range of traditional public health 
services and in most cases would not be expected to be engaged in public health 
preparedness. Other data from the National Profile cannot be easily used because it is not 
related to the measures used in this survey. 
Table 7.   Survey Respondent Identification 
Geopolitical Distribution Survey Response 
Frequency (2013 National 
Profile) 
Number of Respondents 
County  77.78%              (68%) 98 
City or Town   4.76%              (20%) 6 
Multi-County   9.52%                (8%) 12 
Borough   0.00%                (0%) 0 
District   7.94%                (0%) 10 
Other   0.00%                (4%) 0 
Total Respondents  126 
 
In question three, respondents were asked to provide the population served within 
nine population ranges. Table 8 displays the results and indicates-according to the 
NACCHO 2013 National Profile of Local Health Departments-that the survey 
underrepresented small LHDs and overrepresented larger LHDs. According to the 
National Profile, LHDs representing populations in excess of 100,000 totaled less than 25 
percent. In the survey, almost 75 percent of the respondents represented populations in 
excess of 100,000. In addition, the very largest LHDs were not represented likely due to 
the survey not finding its way to the appropriate respondent. These very large 
departments are considered to be more sophisticated and would be expected to be making 
greater use of VBDM tools. 
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Table 8.   Population By Response Frequency 
Population Range Survey Response 
Frequency V. (2013 
National Profile) 
Number of Respondents  
< 25,000   6.25%         (41%) 8 
25,000–49,999 15.63%         (20%) 20 
50,000–99,999 14.06%         (16%) 18 
100,000–249,999 26.56%         (10%) 34 
250,000–499,999 14.06%         (8%) 20 
500,000–999,999 14.06%         (4%) 20 
1,000,000–2,499,999   6.25%         (2%) 8 
2,500,000–4,999,999   1.56%         (0%) 2 
>5,000,000    0.00%        (0%) 0 
Total Respondents  130 
 
Question four asked the respondents to estimate the size of the department’s 
annual budget for public health preparedness. The request for estimated, not actual, data 
recognized that exact budget expenditures are often not available until required annual 
audits have been completed. Budget information is important because it is one possible 
indicator of how much priority the department places on public health preparedness. 
Table 9 shows that almost 50% of the respondents reported their annual preparedness 
budgets to be below $100,000. This is especially concerning given the 
underrepresentation of small departments among the respondents. If preparedness 
budgets are limited for larger departments, then it can be assumed that they are very 
negligible for the vast majority of smaller LHDs. Also of concern is the average budget 
of $250,000–$499,000. No comparable preparedness budget figures are available from 
the National Profile so it is difficult to know if these budget numbers are representative of 
all LHDs. The National Profile does indicate that per capita emergency preparedness 
spending for LHDs of all population sizes was approximately $2.00. This would indicate 
that larger health departments always have total budgets much larger than smaller 
departments.  
Question five asked the respondents to provide information on number of FTEs 
employed in public health preparedness. Even with the underrepresentation of small 
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departments, the overwhelming majority (over 85%) of respondents employed less than 
five FTEs in public health preparedness. These survey results support the findings in the 
literature review regarding the decline in public health staffing and raises serious 
questions about LHD preparedness capacity and capability.  
Table 9.   Annual Budget for Public Health Preparedness 
Annual Budget Response Frequency  Number of Respondents 
<$50,000 17.74% 22 
$50,000–99,999 25.81% 32 
$100,000–199,999 20.97% 28 
$200,000–499,999 25.81% 32 
$500,000–999,999 4.84% 6 
$1,000,000–1,999,999 4.84% 6 
$2,000,000–-3,999,999 0% 0 
$4,000,000–5,999,999 0% 0 
>$6,000,000 0% 0 
Total Respondents  126 
 
C. SURVEY SECTION: PREPAREDNESS COMPETENCY 
To assess preparedness competency, questions six through eight asked the 
respondents to indicate PPHR status, list participation in certain preparedness activities, 
and specify level of participation in VBDM. The collective responses to these three 
questions were intended to provide an overall picture of preparedness competency.  
 Question six proved to be the most important question in the survey. It asked the 
respondents to clarify whether or not their departments are PPHR recognized by 
NACCHO. PPHR recognition is currently the only established national indicator of LHD 
public health preparedness. Overall, about 14% of the local health departments have 
received PPHR recognition. Among the survey respondents over 30% have received 
PPHR recognition. These results may indicate that the survey respondents may represent 
larger, more sophisticated LHDs. However, Table 10 shows the percentage of PPHR and 
non-PPHR departments that responded to the survey and indicates that the average PPHR 
recognized departments had preparedness budgets less than $100,000, while the average 
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non-PPPHR recognized departments had budgets over $200,000. This survey result 
suggests that size of budget does not improve the likelihood that a LHD will be PPHR 
recognized.  
Table 10.   PPHR Recognition 




























































Total Respondents 44 70 12 126 
 
Question 7 (for responses see Table 11) asked the respondents to choose among a 
list of eight preparedness activities in which their departments are engaged. These 
activities represent essential LHD public health preparedness capacity in two key domain 
areas. The domains are surveillance and investigation and exercises and emergency 
events. The first four activities fall within the surveillance and investigation mode. The 
remaining four activities are included in the exercises and emergency events domain. 
Taken together these activities provide insight into the relationship between participation 
in essential preparedness activities and preparedness capacity. With the exception of 
participation in the National Electronic Disease Surveillance System (NEDDS), the 
majority of respondents are highly engaged in the nine essential preparedness activities, 
in percentages ranking as high as 85% for sending/receiving electronic health 
information. As such, these results are not dissimilar enough to be useful in 
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distinguishing between PPHR and non-PPHR respondents. The lack of response 
frequency with respect to NEDDS is not associated with jurisdiction, population served 
or size of preparedness budget. Without proper data, there is no clear explanation as to 
why NEDDS is so under-utilized throughout the variety of LHDs.  
Table 11.   Preparedness Capacity 
Preparedness Activity  Response  Frequency 
Participates in EPI-X 77.42%        96 
Participates in NEDDS 32.26%         40 
Sends/Receives EH Messages 85.48%        106 
Electronic Surveillance System 77.41%     96 
Capability to E Report/Receive 
Lab Info 
74.19%          92 
Participated in CRBN Exercise 62.90%         78 
Rapid Method Send Messages to 
Community Partners 
85.48%        106 
Demonstrated Ability to Manage 
SNS 
85.48%       106 
Total Responses   124   
 
D. SURVEY SECTION: USE OF VBDM 
Question eight asked respondents to specify their use of selected VBDM tools in 
budgeting for preparedness. Because over half of the respondents are using VBDM tools, 
VBDM may be more widespread than suggested in the literature review. This is 
significant because it indicates the possibility of some rapid change occurring in the use 
of VBDM among LHDs.  
Tables 13 and 14 show the frequency with which both PPHR respondents and 
non-PPHR respondents used the five VBDM tools. In both categories, there are only a 
small number of respondents indicating they use VBDM. Even though the numbers are 
small, for each and every one of the five individual VBDM activities, PPHR respondents 
had higher participation rates indicating that PPHR respondents more frequently use 
VBDM tools.  
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In Table 12, the 44 PPHR respondents were most likely to use HVA (20 
respondents of 71 total responses). RA and CEA are the next two most likely VBDM 
tools at 16 and 14 responses respectively. There were seven responses, presumably from 
seven respondents, indicating no VBDM tools are in use in these departments. This is 
where we derive the number of 37 PPHR recognized departments using VBDM tools. 
Table 12.   Use of VBDM in PPHR Respondent LHDs 
VBDM Tools %  PPHR 
Participating/Responses 
CBA 22.73%                 10 
RA 36.36%                 16 
ROI   9.09%                   4 
CEA 31.82%                 14 
HVA 45.45%                 20 
None   31.82%                   7             
Total PPHR Respondents 44         Total Responses  71 
 
Table 13 provides similar results for non-PPHR respondents and indicates that 
VBDM is used by all but 16 of the 70 respondents. There were 132 responses for use of 
each of the VBDM tools and again HVA at 48 responses or 36.36% of all responses was 
the most popular tool used. Next most popular tools were RA, CEA, and CBA. These 
results track very closely with the results for PPHR recognized respondents. 
Table 13.   Use of VBDM in Non-PPHR Respondent LHDs 
VBDM Tools % Non-PPHR Participating/ 
Responses 
CBA   13.64%                 18 
RA   19.70%                 26 
ROI     4.55 %                  6 
CEA   13.64%                 18 
HVA   36.36%                 48 
None   12.11%                 16 
Total Respondents 70 Total Responses  132 
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Questions 9–13 are specific to individual VBDM tools and asked the respondents 
to identify the role (percentage) that each tool plays in preparedness budget decisions. 
Table 14 shows the cumulative survey results for each question. Unfortunately, less than 
half of the 44 PPHR recognized departments and only 14 of the 70 non-PPHR 
respondents completed any of these five questions. In addition, if a respondent indicated 
that they are using a VBDM tool less than 10% of the time, the actual number could be 
zero. The survey instrument was not specific enough to determine what a response of less 
than 10% meant in actual numbers. Given the poor response to these questions, it is not 
possible to make predictions that will hold true for all LHDs in the country. Accordingly, 
the responses to these five questions cannot be meaningfully used in explaining any 
relationship between specific VBDM tools and how they are used in PPHR and Non-
PPHR recognized LHDs.  
Table 14.   Use by PPHR Response  
Preparedness Decisions Impacted/Responses 
PPHR 
%  of 
Departments 
CBA RA ROI CEA HVA 
% # % # % # % # % # 
< 10% 28.56% 4 33.33% 6 66.67% 8 55.56% 10 25.00% 6 
10–25% 42.86% 6 11.11% 2 16.67% 2 0.00% 0 41.67% 10 
26–50% 14.29% 2 44.44% 8 0.00% 0 33.33% 6 16.67% 4 
51–75% 0.00% 0 11.10% 2 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 8.33% 2 
>75% 14.29% 2 0.00% 0 16.67% 2 11.11% 2 8.33% 2 
Non-PPHR 
%  of 
Departments 
CBA RA ROI CEA HVA 
% # % # % # % # % # 
< 10% 25.00% 2 42.86% 6 66.67% 4 50.00% 4 14.29% 4 
10–25% 75.00% 6 42.86% 6 33.33% 2 50.00% 4 50.00% 14 
26–50% 0.00% 0 14.29% 2 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 28.57% 8 
51–75% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 
>75% 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 7.14% 2 
Total 




E. SURVEY SECTION: OPINION ON PREPAREDNESS CAPABILITY 
The final survey question asked the respondents to estimate their department’s 
preparedness level. The responses were not requested in a Likert Scale format but do 
provide some subjective assessments of preparedness capability related to use of VBDM 
tools and budget size. Table 15 looks at use of VBDM in relation to opinions on 
preparedness capability reveals that capable respondents were more likely to use VBDM 
tools than respondents who believed they were not preparedness capable. Although small, 
the numbers consistently indicate an association between capability and use of VBDM 
tools.  






























































































































































































































































































































6 4 32 70 6 8 0 0 126 
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However, one of the respondents who chose not to answer the question 
commented, “No one is capable of managing any disaster only ‘mitigating’ them look at 
New Orleans or Joplin, Missouri.” This observation might be useful for continuing 
research beyond this thesis by addressing the “managing versus mitigating” question. 
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VI. SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS/IMPLICATIONS/A VBDM MODEL 
A. SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS  
Table 16 provides the following information: the observed cell totals, (the 
expected cell totals), and the (Chi square statistic for each cell). Examining each cell 
permits an assessment as to whether or not the four propositions supported.  







• Proposition 1: LHDs in situation (a) should rank higher in number of 
respondents that are PPHR recognized, because these departments also use 
VBDM. Proposition 1 is supported. Cell (a) indicates that 37 of the 44 
respondents who are PPHR recognized use VBDM. 
• Proposition 2: LHDs in situation (b) should rank lower in number of 
respondents that are PPHR recognized, because these departments do not 
use VBDM. Proposition 2 is supported. Cell (b) includes only 7 of the 44 
PPHR recognized respondents. 
• Proposition 3: LHDs in situation (c) should rank higher in number of 
respondents that are not PPHR recognized, because these department use 
VBDM. Proposition 3 is supported. The overwhelming majority of non-
PPHR respondents, 54 of 70, are found in cell (c). 
• Proposition 4: LHDs in situation (d) should have the lower number of 
departments among non-PPHR departments because they are not using 
VBDM. This proposition is supported. Only 16 of the 54 non-PPHR 
respondents indicate that they are not using VBDM tools. 
Preparedness 
Competency 




37 (35.12) (0.1) 
(a) 
7 (8.88)  (0.4) 
(b) 
          44 
Not PPHR 
Recognized 
54 (55.88) (0.06) 
(c) 
16 (14.12)  (0.25) 
(d) 
         70 
Totals 91 23         114 
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B. STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE 
Even if all four propositions are supported, are the results statistically significant? 
The responses listed in Tables 10 were filtered by yes and no answers to PPHR 
recognition and derived a total of seven out of 44 PPHR recognized respondents that did 
not use VBDM and 16 of 70 non-PPHR recognized respondents that did not use VBDM. 
Applying the Pearson Chi-square formula to above, we get: 
 Chi-square = 114 [(37)(16) – (7)(54)]2 / (44)(70)(23)(91) = 0.8715  
In order to refine the calculations, we need to know how many degrees of 
freedom we have. When a comparison is made between one sample and another, a simple 
rule is that the degrees of freedom equal (number of columns minus one) x (number of 
rows minus one) not counting the totals for rows or columns. For our data this gives (2-1) 
x (2-1) = 1. 
We now have our chi square statistic (x2 = 0.8715), our predetermined alpha level 
of significance (0.05), and our degrees of freedom (df = 1). Using a Chi square 
distribution table with 1 degree of freedom, we read find our value of x2 (0.8715) lies 
between 0.455 and 2.706. The corresponding probability is between the 0.5 and 0.10 
probability levels. That means that the p-value is above 0.05 (it is actually 0.35054). 
Since a p-value of 0.35054 is greater than the conventionally accepted significance level 
of 0.05 (i.e., p > 0.05) we fail to reject the null hypothesis. In other words, there is no 
statistically significant difference in the proportion of PPHR recognized LHDs that utilize 
VBDM. 
C. IMPLICATIONS 
Even though the results are not statistically significant at either the 0.05 or 0.10 
level, it is still important to look at themes that have emerged from this research and their 
implications for shaping a new model for financing public health preparedness. These 
emerging trends are contained in Table 17 and are grouped around four themes: impact, 
focus, enhance, and inform. 
The “impact” theme highlights the continued financial woes that have plagued 
LHDs over the past several years. The stagnant economy and fiscal austerity have ring-
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fenced public health preparedness budgets. Almost half of the respondents are protecting 
their publics with preparedness budgets totaling less than $100,000. Almost 85% of the 
responding LHDs have fewer than five FTE employees dedicated to public health 
preparedness. Diminished budgets and staff are a direct result of decreased PHEP 
funding, which provide the majority of local preparedness funding.  
As a result, LHDs have had to explore alternative models for addressing 
preparedness needs. One option is regionalization and another is enhanced public-private 
partnership. Nebraska regionalized its local public health system and improved 
preparedness by spreading specialized human resources all over the state.40 California 
also adopted a regional approach, shifting personnel previously dedicated to preparedness 
activities to traditional public health services.41 In collaboration with the local health 
department, Milwaukee hospitals established a regional emergency medicine Internet 
system to securely share real-time ambulance diversion information.42  
Another emerging “impact” item was the need for increased flexibility in 
developing preparedness programs specific to a need or a locale. Some respondents 
commented that they were frustrated by the “one-size fits all” mentality embodied in 
the current PHEP grants.  
The second distinct theme emerging from the survey is the need to “focus” on 
expanding the number of LHDs that have received PPHR recognition. Nationally, 
NACCHO reports that 394 of the 2532 LHDs (15.6%) in 26 states have voluntarily 
sought and received PPHR recognition. Within the survey, over one-third (44) of the 
responding departments are PPHR recognized. PPHR recognition is criteria-based and 
40 David Palm and Colleen Svoboda, "A Regional Approach to Organizing Local Public Health 
Systems and the Impact on Emergency Preparedness: The Nebraska Experience," Public Health Reports 
123 (2008). 
41 "Regionalization in Local Public Health Systems," California Public Health Policy Forum, 
September 2007, accessed December 8, 2013, 
http://www.cahpf.org/GoDocUserFiles/412.RegionalizationIssueBriefFinal.pdf, accessed December 8, 
2013. 
42 "Public Health Surveillance and Communications Using Regional Emergency Medicine Internet," 




                                                 
has three components: all-hazards preparedness planning; workforce capacity 
development; and readiness demonstrated through exercises and real events. The PPHR 
criteria incorporate the latest federal preparedness recommendations, including the 
National Incident Management System (NIMS), Homeland Security Exercise and 
Evaluation Program (HSEEP), and current PHEP guidance.43 
Table 17.   Emergent Findings 




Preparedness Budgets Are 
Ring-Fenced 
 
Program Flexibility Limited 
                 Focus 
PPHR Recognition 
Broader Determinants of Public 
Health Preparedness 
 
Longer Term Impacts 
            Enhance 
LHD Analytical Capability and 
Use of Priority-Setting Tools 
  
                 Inform 




As such, the PPHR criteria constitute the only set of comprehensive national 
public health preparedness standards. It is imperative that more local public health 
departments achieve PPHR recognition to demonstrate readiness capability. 
The “focus” theme also includes the need to develop broader determinants of 
public health preparedness. Several of the survey respondents commented that traditional 
public health activities like disease surveillance encompassed and surpassed many of the 
PPHR criteria and should be considered in any definition of preparedness. 
43 Project Public Health Ready Webpage, NACCHO, accessed December 12, 2013, 
http://naccho.org/topics/emergency/PPHR/index.cfm. 
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In addition, survey respondents also commented on the need to focus on longer 
term evidence-based results instead of one-time low impact interventions. Implementing 
this idea would require the PHEP funding program to develop longitudinal measures that 
change the funding cycles from annual grants to multi-year grants.   
The “enhance” theme relates to LHD need to be more analytical in setting priority 
spending goals. The survey results indicated that most LHDs use VBDM. Comments 
like, “the state bureau determines our funding amount from federal funds and sets 
spending constraints,” illustrate the feeling of helplessness that many LHDs feel 
regarding their role in determining financing decisions. However, as federal funds 
continue to decline, the use of VBDM will become increasingly important as LHDs seek 
support and funding from public and private sources.  
The fourth and final theme emerging from the survey is the “inform” theme. 
Ultimately, all public policy decisions are political decisions. The survey respondents 
frequently commented they did not use VBDM because it was futile, or as one 
respondent said, “politicians don’t want objective information.” The survey confirmed 
that only a small number of the responding LHDs indicated that they regularly used 
VBDM. In order to increase the use of VBDM it is imperative that policymakers 
understand and use analytical information in making investment/disinvestment decisions.  
D. ESTABLISHING A VALUE-BASED MODEL FOR FINANCING PUBLIC 
 HEALTH PREPAREDNESS 
This research project has confirmed the idea that VBDM holds substantial 
promise for improving the methods for financing public health preparedness. The 
essential components of such a model are national preparedness standards, use of 
common analytics, and political buy-in. Each of these components must overcome 
implementation hurdles before VBDM can be deemed a successful alternative to the 
existing political model. Figure 3 depicts one potential VBDM model for financing 
public health preparedness.  
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Figure 3.  The VBDM Model 
The VBDM model starts with a public health preparedness issue or initiative. 
Next, the LHD analyzes the issue/initiative using RA, HVA and one or more of the 
value-based tools such as CBA. The model requires a RA and HVA in every analytical 
process because knowing risk is essential to calculating benefits, effectiveness, and ROI. 
The completed analysis results in a value-based decision grounded in objective measures 
of success. 
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VII.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
The survey responses pointed out significant problems in the public health 
preparedness system for which there are no easy solutions. Budgets are extremely tight 
and staffs are strained. Most of the public health preparedness funding comes from one 
federal grant (PHEP) that has been declining every year for the last seven years. There is 
only one national program that recognizes preparedness capacity and very few LHDs 
have received recognition. In addition, only a small number of LHDs make use of more 
than one VBDM tool and survey comments like “the state determines our priorities” 
suggest a LHD reluctance to taking strategic approaches to financing public health 
preparedness. Given this environment, it is not surprising that a number of the survey 
respondents seriously questioned their internal capability to handle both natural and 
manmade disasters.  
In their groundbreaking work on VBDM, Pines, Pilkington, and Seabury made 
seven recommendations “to provide a roadmap for enhancing the sustainability of 
preparedness efforts in the United States”:44 
• The federal government should develop measures of emergency 
preparedness both at the community-level and nationally.  
• Measures developed should be used to conduct a nation-wide gap analysis 
of community preparedness.  
• Alternative ways of distributing funding should be considered to ensure all 
communities can build and sustain local coalitions that can support 
sufficient infrastructure.  
• When monies are released for specific projects, there should be clear 
metrics of grant effectiveness.  
• There should be better coordination at the federal level, including funding 
and grant guidance.  
• Local communities should build coalitions or use existing coalitions to 
building public-private partnerships with local hospitals and other 
businesses with a stake in preparedness.  
44 Pines, Pilkington, and Seabury, 3. 
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• Communities should be encouraged to engage in creative ways to finance 
local preparedness efforts. 
These recommendations are focused on changes at the system level and aim to 
correct deficiencies that hamper public health preparedness and response efforts. This 
thesis corroborated the need for system level change but emphasized programmatic 









VIII.  IDEAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
During the past several years, a number of public health emergencies ranging 
from pandemics to hurricanes have seriously challenges the preparedness capacity of 
LHDs. A persistent theme in the literature review was the need to be better prepared to 
respond to both natural and man-made events. Preparation requires adequate budget and 
staff to perform at a base level. Overall, the U.S. has 50,000 fewer public health 
employees than it did in 1990.45 
While survey respondents expressed frustration with diminished budgets, they 
also offered some recommendations that may be helpful in strengthening the LHD 
preparedness infrastructure. Not surprisingly, the respondents called for stable and 
sustained preparedness funding. They also recommended separate grant funding for 
“personnel to perform investigations on diseases and epidemics to leverage staff 
availability for emergency operations.” 
In this time of fiscal austerity, it is critical that LHDs spend their preparedness 
funds efficiently and effectively. PHEP guidelines mandate that their funds be spent in 
strict accordance with grant requirements. These requirements ensure and promote 
efficiency but do not help LHDs understand the relationship between budgets and 
outcomes. For the most part, these guidelines do not identify areas where significant gaps 
require additional capability analysis. In addition, PHEP does not require a risk 
assessment at the local level as a condition of receiving funds.  
 In the smaller and less sophisticated LHDs, there appeared to be little enthusiasm 
and support for VBDM. Some survey respondents expressed the feeling that analytical 
tools “would not improve their decision-making process.”  
 Here are some ideas that could link expenditures to outcomes: 
• LHDs could develop decision support systems for guiding preparedness 
funding decisions. 
45 Trust for America's Health, Ready or Not? Protecting the Public's Health from Diseases, Disasters, 
and Bioterrorism 2010.  
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• LHDs could conduct comparative analyses that identify gaps in essential 
preparedness capability areas. 
• LHDs could develop performance-based preparedness plans containing 
clearly defined outcome objectives. 
• PHEP grants might be made competitive and based on which LHDs can 
demonstrate success in achieving outcomes.  




Although this research failed to demonstrate a statistically significant relationship 
between VBDM and preparedness competency. The ability to analytically demonstrate 
the benefit of public health preparedness could be beneficial in attracting additional 
funding for public health preparedness. Widespread use of VBDM might also facilitate 
political buy-in as well as enhance the capability of LHDs to implement evidence-based 
preparedness strategies. If the downward funding trend is to be reversed, the use of a 
VBDM may be the only alternative to a much politicized appropriations process. 
In the final analysis, most public health preparedness funding is determined 
within a political environment. The product of this political process is the annual 
appropriation for the PHEP grant. Policymakers have a vested interest in public health 
preparedness programs that improve security and protect the health of all citizens.  
While PHEP funds have dramatically decreased over the last six years, LHDs 
have struggled to find a strategy that will stabilize funding. The survey results 
demonstrated that LHDs that use VBDM have higher preparedness scores than 
departments that do not use VBDM. If VBDM does indeed improve public health 
preparedness capabilities, it is imperative that policymakers be helped to understand how 
to use VBDM to improve the appropriations process. To enhance the credibility and use 
of VBDM the following messages must be communicated to and understood by key 
decision makers:  
• Risks, effectiveness, and benefits-can be accurately measured and 
associated with costs. 
• Grant allocation formulas should be directly linked to threat, vulnerability, 
and consequences of terrorist acts. 
• Create a local public health security preparedness index to provide a basis 




While this thesis did not demonstrate a statistically significant relationship 
between value-based decision-making and preparedness competency, the findings 
indicate that a large number of local health departments are using value-based decision-
making in their preparedness financing decision process. This is important research that 
has demonstrated future directions for how we may allocate scarce financial resources 
while improving performance. Policy makers at all levels of government should pay 
attention to the findings and the opportunities for enhancing preparedness competencies 




APPENDIX A.  SURVEY QUESTIONS 
MEASURING PUBLIC HEALTH PREPAREDNESS COMPETENCY SURVEY 
RESULTS 
 
Q1. Informed Consent. I understand that no information provided in this survey 
will   identify me or any other person who may assist me in completing this 
survey. I further understand that the results of this survey will be used in a 
graduate level thesis at the Naval Postgraduate School. I understand that taking 
this survey involves no risks or hazards greater than those encountered in 
normal living activities. I understand that I will receive no compensation or 
benefits will be derived by me personally as a result of completing this survey. I 
understand that a copy of the research results will be available at the conclusion 
of this research through the Homeland Security Digital Library. I understand 
that all records of this study will be kept confidential and that my privacy will 
be protected. No information will be accessible by any person that could 
identify me as a participant. I understand that my participation is strictly 
voluntary, and if I agree to participate, I am free to withdraw at any time 
without prejudice. I understand that if I have any questions or concerns about 
this survey upon the completion of my participation, I should contact Dr. 
William Pilkington,wfpilkington@cabarrushealth.org or the Principal 
Investigator, Dr. Robert Josefek, rjosefek@gmail.com. Any medical questions 
should be addressed to LTC Eric Morgan, MC, USA, (CO, POM Medical 
Clinic), eric.morgan@nw.amedd.army.mil. Any other questions or concerns 
may be addressed to the IRB Chair, LT Brent Olde, baolde@nps.edu. I have 
been provided with a full explanation of the purpose, procedures, and duration 
of my participation in this research project. I understand that by agreeing to 





Answer Choices Responses/Response Count 
I consent 100.00% 138 
I do not consent 0.00% 0 
















Answer Choices                                          Response Percent/Response Count 
County 79.03% 98 
City or Town 4.84% 6 
Multi-County 8.06% 10 
Borough 0.00% 0 
District 8.06% 10 
Other 0.00% 0 
 





Answer Choices Response Percent/Response Count 
< 25,000 6.25% 8 
25,000–49,999 15.63% 20 
50,000–99,999 14.06% 18 
100,000–249,999 26.56% 34 
250,000–499,999 14.06% 18 
500,000–999,999 15.63% 20 
1,000,000–2,499,000 6.25% 8 
2,500,000–4,999,000 1.56%  2 



















Q4: Estimate you annual budget for preparedness related programs for the most 





Answer Choices Response Percent/Response Count 
<$50,000 17.74% 22 
$50,000–$99,999 25.81% 32 
$100,000–$199,999 20.97% 26 
$200,000–-$499,999 25.81% 32 
$500,000–$999,999 4.84% 6 
$1,000,000–$1,999,999 4.84% 6 
$2,000,000–$3,999,999 0.00% 0 
$4,000,000-$5,999,999 0.00% 0 
>$6,000,000 0.00% 0 
 





Answer Choices Response Percent/Response Count 
<5 FTEs 85.48% 106 
5–10 FTEs 12.90% 16 
11–24 FTEs 1.61% 2 
25–99 FTEs 0.00% 0 
100–249 FTEs 0.00% 0 
250–499 FTEs 0.00% 0 
>500 FTEs 0.00% 0 
 
 






Answer Choices Responses Percent/Response Count 
Yes 33.87% 42 
No 56.45% 70 








Answer Choices Responses Percent/Response Count 
Participates in EPI-X 77.05% 94 
Participates in NEDSS 31.15% 38 























Rapid Method to Send 





Demonstrated Ability to 
Manage the Strategic 









Answer Choices Responses Percent/Response Count 
Cost-Benefit Analysis 12.90% 16 
Risk Analysis 22.58% 28 















 Q9: If your department uses cost-benefit analysis in developing and evaluating 
preparedness budget decisions, please estimate the percentage of preparedness 





Answer Choices Responses Percent/Response Count 
<10% 25.00% 6 
10%–25% 58.33% 14 
26%–50% 8.33% 2 
51%–75% 0.00% 0 
76%–100% 8.33% 2 
Total Respondents  24 
 
 
Q10: If your department uses risk analysis in developing and evaluating 
preparedness budget decisions, please estimate the percentage of preparedness 





Answer Choices Responses Percent/Response Count 
<10% 38.89 %        14 
10%–25% 22.22%           8 
26%–50% 33.33%         12 
51%–75% 5.56%           2 
>75% 0.00%             0 















Q11: If your department uses ROI analysis in developing and evaluating 
preparedness budget decisions, please estimate the percentage of preparedness 





Answer Choices Responses Percent/Response Count 
<10% 66.67%              12 
10%–25% 22.22%                4 
26%–50% 0.00%                 0 
51%–75% 0.00%                 0 
>75% 11.11%               2 




A12: If your department uses cost-effectiveness analysis in developing and 
evaluating preparedness budget decisions, please estimate percentage of the 





Answer Choices Responses Percent/Response Count 
<10% 50.00%                    14 
10%–25% 21.43%                      6 
26%–50% 21.43%                      6 
51%–75%   0.00%                      0 
>75%   7.14%                      2 

















Q13: If your department uses hazard vulnerability analysis in developing and 
evaluating preparedness budget decisions, please estimate the percentage of 





Answer Choices Responses Percent/Response Count 
<10% 19.23%             10 
10%–25% 46.12%             24 
26%–-50% 23.08%             12 
51%–75% 3.85%                 2 
>75% 7.69%                 4 
Total Respondents  52 
 
Q14: Finally, how would you rank your department’s preparedness level on the following 





Answer Choices Responses Percent/Response Count 
Capable of Managing 
Any Man-made Disaster 
4.76%        6 
Capable of Managing 
Any Natural Disaster 
9.52%      12 
Capable of Managing 
Most Man-made 
Disasters 
14.29%    18 
Capable of Managing 
Most Natural Disasters 
57.14%    72 
Only Capable of 
Managing Small-Scale 
Man-made Disasters 
4.76%        6 
Only Capable of 
Managing Small-Scale 
Natural Disasters 
7.94%      10 
Not Capable of 
Managing Any Man-
made Disasters 
1.59%        2 
Not Capable of 
Managing Any Natural 
Disasters 
0.00%        0 
Total Respondents  126 
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APPENDIX B.  COMMENTS FROM RESPONDENTS 
Q6: Is your department recognized by NACCHO as being Project Public Health 
Ready (PPHR)?  
• Waiting for approval by NACCHO  
• Applying this year 
Q7: Please check all preparedness activities conducted by your department. 
• Currently taking another look at our security for SNS  
• Planning, training, exercising, responding, participating in preparedness activities 
with partner agencies, and more  
• EPI-X and NEDSS would be through FDOH Central Office and view only for this 
health department.  
• Member of the local EOC  
Q8: In budgeting for preparedness, does your department use any of the following? 
• Funding received is for 4 FTEs only, not projects  
• The state bureau determines our funding amount from federal funds and sets 
spending constraints  
• Staffing and activities to meet grant deliverables  
• Planning around PHEP Capabilities, etc.  
• We strive to meet the benchmarks established in the agreement with the state. We 
also strive to be a convener and active partner with our three counties in 
emergency preparedness planning and exercises.  
• State of Michigan dictates what level of revenue we receive.  
• Politicians don’t want objective information.  
Q14: Finally, how would you rank your department’s preparedness level on the 
following scale? Choose the one that best describes your situation. 
• Capable with partners of managing most natural disasters (exception: major 
earthquake)  
• Capable of also handling most man-made disasters  
• Equal ability to manage most man-made and natural disasters.  
• Also capable of managing most man-made disasters, but not given option to select 
more than one.  
• Capable of managing small scale man-made disasters and most natural disasters, 
we just don’t have the depth of staffing.  
• Can handle natural and man-made disasters, however could not handle nuclear or 
catastrophic natural  
• Capable of managing BOTH Most man-made and natural disasters  
• Also could manage most natural disasters  
• No one is Capable of Managing any Disaster only “Mitigating” them look at New 
Orleans or Joplin MO  
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• Most natural and some man made. No option here for any or some of both?  
• This all depends on scale so difficult to answer question as posed  
• Cannot ck more than 1 but could add most manmade disasters also  
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